ing juvenile crime and to minimizing the involvement of juveniles in the juvenile and criminal justice systems.3
Until 1974, the federal government played a relatively minor role in the juvenile delinquency system. In that year, Congress, in accor dance with a general trend toward federalizing crime, greatly ex panded the jurisdiction of the federal government over juvenile crime.4 Historically, crime, and particularly juvenile crime, was the re sponsibility of state governments with very little involvement by the federal government.5 In fact, the only major statute that dealt with ju venile crime was the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act of 1938 ("FJDA") .6 The FIDA offered the United States Attorney General discretion in deciding whether to prosecute a juvenile under the age of eighteen who had not been surrendered to state officials or had been charged with offenses punishable by life imprisonment or death.7 The federal government rarely employed this statute, and therefore federal involvement in juvenile delinquency proceedings remained virtually nonexistent until 1974. In that year, Congress passed the Juvenile Jus tice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 ("JJDPA")8 because it felt that federal intervention was necessary to stem rising juvenile crime rates, specifically, violent juvenile crime.9
Congress's enactment of the JJDP A was also motivated in part by the haphazard way in which the federal government had previously been attempting to alleviate the problem of juvenile delinquency. The Senate, in 1974, stated that there was " [l] ittle coherent national plan ning or established priority structure among the major programs dealing with the problems of youth development and delinquency pre vention . . . . The present array of programs demonstrates the lack of priorities, emphasis and direction in the Federal Government's efforts to combat delinquency."10
The JJDPA drastically changed federal involvement in the field of juvenile delinquency. Congress created a broad federal approach that addressed both treatment and prosecution of juvenile offenders. The major focus of the legislation was to provide funding for research and programs to assist the states in their efforts to address the delinquency problem.11 In addition to these programs, Congress vastly expanded the basis for assuming federal jurisdiction over juvenile offenders.12 As currently amended,13 the JJDPA provides for prosecution of a ju venile in federal court when:
[T]he Attorney General,14 after investigation, certifies to the appropriate district court of the United States that (1) the juvenile court or other ap propriate court of a State does not have jurisdiction or refuses to assume jurisdiction over said juvenile . . . , (2) the State does not have available programs and services adequate for the needs of juveniles, or (3) the of fense charged is a crime of violence that is a felony or [one of a specified number of drug or gang-related crimes], and that there is a substantial Federal interest in the case or the offense to warrant the exercise of Fed eral jurisdiction.15
Accordingly, a United States Attorney who desires to proceed against a juvenile in federal court must certify the existence of one of the three factors listed above and that a substantial federal interest exists in the prosecution.16 In practice, this requirement is often met by a certification simply stating that these elements exist, without fur ther explanation or support.17
11. See infra notes 67-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of the JJDP A.
12. The change from the FIDA to the JIDPA was significant because Congress created precise procedural guidelines for trying juveniles in federal court that did not exist under the FIDA. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 5032. Accordingly, these changes provided the United States with the means to assume federal jurisdiction over juvenile offenders. Furthermore, the JIDPA, as will be seen in the remainder of this Note, devoted substantial federal resources to the problem of juvenile delinquency. See Section I.A.
13. Congress made significant amendments to the JIDPA in 1984, see , § 1201 (adding the "substantial Federal interest" requirement, lowering the transfer age to fifteen, and expanding jurisdiction by adding additional crimes), and in 1988, see Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6467(a) (significantly expanding federal jurisdiction).
14. "Under the authorization found in 28 C.F.R. § 0.57, the Attorney General has dele gated her certification and transfer authority to the United States Attorneys." United States v. Juvenile Male #1, 86 F.3d 1314 #1, 86 F.3d , 1317 #1, 86 F.3d n.3 (4th Cir. 1996 .
15. 18 U.S.C.A. § 5032 (citations omitted).
16. There is a separate split in the federal circuits over whether the "substantial federal interest" prong is required in all certifications or just for certifications involving a crime of violence. This issue is beyond the scope of this Note and not relevant to the determination of the issue that it addresses. This Note will argue that courts should review the certification whenever the substantial federal interest must be asserted, regardless of how often this oc curs. For a general discussion of this issue, see Un ited States v. Juvenile #1, 118 F.3d 298, 303 n.6 (5th Cir. 1997).
17. A typical certification would include the following information: that there was "a substantial federal interest in the case and the offenses warrant[ed] the exercise of Federal [Vol. 98:1007 In response to the federalization of juvenile delinquency and the increasing focus on federal jurisdiction, some juveniles have ques tioned whether a substantial federal interest exists in their case and have sought judicial review of the prosecutor's certification.18 The cir cuit courts are split over the appropriateness of judicial review in this context. The Fourth Circuit has held that the certification should be reviewable by courts.19 In so holding, it relied on the legislative history of the JJDPA, which stresses the importance of states' control over ju venile delinquency, and Supreme Court precedent stating that certain certifications regarding jurisdiction over juveniles made by prosecu tors should be subject to judicial review.20 Many circuits, however, have disagreed with the Fourth Circuit's approach.21 With slight varia tion, these courts have argued that the plain language of the JJDPA precludes judicial review.22 Furthermore, their holdings state that when the certification is based upon a judgment call by a prosecutor, the certification belongs to a category of unreviewable prosecutorial decisions. 23 The Supreme Court established the ability of a lower court to sub stantively review a certification by a federal prosecutor in 21. See Jarrett, 133 F.3d at 541 {holding that "courts cannot review the substantive basis of the Attorney General's certification of a 'substantial federal interest' "); United States v. Juvenile Male J.AJ., 134 F.3d at 908; United States v. Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d 298, 304 {5th Cir. 1997); United States v. I.D.P., 102 F.3d 507, 511 {11th Cir. 1996) (holding that "[i] n the absence of purely formal error on the face of the certification or proof of bad faith on the part of the government .. . certifications made in accord with section 5032 customarily 'must be accepted as final'"); United States v. Doe, 49 F.3d 859, 866-67 {2d Cir. 1995) (permitting judicial review of whether the offense charged met the statutory requirements of the JJDPA); United States v. Vancier, 515 F.2d 1378 , 1380 {2d Cir. 1975 . 22 See supra note 21. Despite claims by some courts that the JJDPA precludes substan tive review of the certification, all of the circuits are in agreement that courts do have the authority to review the certification for technical compliance with the requirements of the JJDPA. See, e.g. , United States v. Baker, 10 F.3d 1374 , 1396 {9th Cir. 1993 ) (reviewing the age of the juvenile and its application to the statute's requirements for prosecution); United States v. Cuomo, 525 F.2d 1285 , 1287 -89 {5th Cir. 1976 ) (ensuring that the certifying party was the proper one and that the certification was timely).
23. See, e.g., Jarrett, 133 F.3d at 539-40; United States v. C.G., 736 F.2d 1474 , 1478 {11th Cir. 1984 . · 24. 515 U.S. 417 {1995). 25. 86 F.3d 1314 25. 86 F.3d (4th Cir. 1996 .
Supreme Court upheld review of a prosecutor's certification under the Westfall Act that a federal employee was acting in the "scope-of employment. "26 In Westfall Act certifications, the prosecutor certifies that a federal government employee was acting in the scope of his or her employment when an incident, usually a tort, occurred.27 Once the certification is made, the United States is substituted as the defendant in the litigation.28 In Gutierrez de Martinez, the Court first noted that because "federal judges traditionally proceed from the 'strong pre sumption that Congress intends judicial review,' "29 review will not be precluded unless there is a "persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of Congress. "30 Based upon this presumption, the Gu tierrez de Martinez Court re lied on three primary elements of the Westfall Act in permitting re view. First, the Court examined the statutory language and concluded that Congress made no mention of a court's inability to review a prosecutor's certification.31 Second, the Court found it significant that the legislative history of the Westfall Act showed that Congress did not "commit . . . 'scope-of-employment' [decisions] . . . to the unre viewable judgment of the Attorney General."32 Based on these textual examinations, the Court held that it did not find any persuasive basis "discernible from the statutory fog" to conclude that Congress in tended to restrict judicial review.33 Instead, the Court found just the opposite -that evidence existed indicating Congress may have fa vored review.34 The third element in the Court's consideration in volved important policy considerations that militated against preclud ing review. The Court found that the United States has a strong financial incentive in the certification of the employee as acting within the scope of his employment.35 Additionally, the substitution of the United States for the employee defendant upon certification under the Westfall Act could result in the dismissal of the suit by the court under sovereign immunity principles.36 The Court concluded that the com- bination of these two policy considerations and the lack of a statutory bar to judicial review supported the notion that Congress did not in tend to preclude judicial review of the prosecutor's certification.37 Thus, the Court held that review of the certification should be permit ted.
Following the Gu tierrez de Martinez framework, this Note argues that the review of certifications under the JJDP A should be permitted. In the limited area of juvenile delinquency law, traditional notions of prosecutorial discretion should yield to the unique circumstances sur rounding the prosecution of children. Children should not be treated as if they are simply young adults. They have unique needs and re quire special treatment by the legal system.33 As a result, courts should scrupulously review the certification for compliance with terms of the JJDP A to ensure that federal jurisdiction is assumed only when a substantial federal interest exists.39 Part I of this Note analyzes the plain language and legislative history of the JJDPA to show that Congress intended to limit the bases for federal jurisdiction and to provide for judicial review over certification of juvenile cases to fed eral courts. Part II argues that the policy of federal abstention and the law's special treatment of children support judicial review of certifica tions in the juvenile delinquency arena. The historical difference in treatment of juvenile offenders is sufficient to overcome the tradi tional deference given to prosecutorial decisionmaking. Courts should review the certifications providing for federal jurisdiction over a child to ensure that a substantial federal interest is present in the prosecu tion of a child in the federal courts.
I.
AN 39. Traditional notions of prosecutorial discretion would either categorically prohibit judicial review or would limit challenges to substantive compliance, such as if the crime committed is in fact a felony.
40.
For a discussion of the amendments to the JJDPA, see supra note 13.
41. For a list of the statutory requirements for certification, see supra text accompanying note 15. must be viewed in light of the history and philosophy of the JJDP A. When federal jurisdiction is sought, it becomes clear that judicial re view of prosecutorial certifications, to ensure that juveniles are tried in the most appropriate forum, is a central component of federal in volvement in the juvenile delinquency system.
In order to determine whether Congress intended to preclude judi cial review, courts review the plain language and legislative history of statutes.42 The Court has found judicial review to be precluded either when Congress has expressly barred review or when a statute provides no meaningful standards to guide judicial review.43 Section I.A argues that the plain language of the statute exhibits no congressional intent to preclude judicial review. Vol. 98:1007 cise issue, it held that courts have the authority and the ability to re view substantively the prosecutor's certification under the Act. 49 Some courts have distinguished the absence of preclusion language in the JJDPA from the Westfall Act because the section of the JJDPA that describes the transfer provision50 contains standards by which a court can determine if the transfer of a juvenile to criminal court is in the interest of justice.51 Some courts have argued that the inclusion of standards in one section of the statute (the transfer provision) and not in another (the certification provision) demonstrates that Congress knew how to craft these standards if it desired to do so. 52 Therefore, Congress can be assumed to have purposefully excluded the standards from the other section.53
Although this construction may create a presumption that Congress intended to exclude review of the certification, it is insuffi cient to overcome the Gu tierrez de Marti nez Court's rationale for ju dicial review.54 The review of the prosecutor's certification is critical to the court's traditional constitutional role of protecting the citizenry from arbitrary and unconstitutional actions by other coordinate branches of government.ss Without the oversight role of the courts, the judicial branch would be relegated to the "rubber-stamp work" of making decisions in cases based entirely upon actions of the Executive Branch.s6 The mission of the courts and the process of judicial delib eration is not consistent with this type of "mechanical judgment. "s7 49. See Gutierrez de Martin ez, 515 U.S. at 436-37.
50. The transfer provision permits the courts to transfer a juvenile from juvenile to adult status. Section 5032 discusses both the certification procedure, which establishes federal ju risdiction, and the transfer procedure. The transfer provision explicitly provides for judicial review: "Evidence of the following factors shall be considered, and findings with regard to each factor shall be made in the record, in assessing whether a transfer would be in the inter est of justice." 18 U.S. C.A. § 5032.
51. The statute lists the following such factors: "the age and social background of the juvenile; the nature of the alleged offense; the extent and nature of the juvenile's prior de linquency record; the juvenile's present intellectual development and psychological maturity; the nature of past treatment efforts and the juvenile's response to such efforts; the availabil ity of programs designed to treat the juvenile's behavioral problems." 18 U.S.C.A. § 5032, 52 See, e.g., United States v. Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d 298, 305 (5th Cir. 1997 16, 23 (1983) , which states that " [w] here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts inten tionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion" (emphasis added)); see also Although Congress did not address the question of judicial review in the text of the statute, the legislative history of the JJDPA evinces congressional intent to provide for judicial review of the prosecutor's certification. First, it emphasizes the importance of the policy of fed eral abstention. Second, the legislative history establishes standards by which courts can review the certification to determine if the crime at issue implicates the substantial federal interest needed to override the policy of federal deference to the states.
Fe deral Abstention
The legislative history of the JJDP A includes an exhaustive over view of the activities and efforts by states to address the problem of juvenile delinquency.62 As was stated by the 1974 drafters and reiter ated in the subsequent amendments to the juvenile justice statute, "ju venile delinquency matters should generally be handled by the States."63 Congress recognized that the certification requirement was as a court judgment an executive officer's decision, but stripped of capacity to evaluate inde pendently whetll er tlle executive's decision is correct."). Il.B.
57
61. The scope of prosecutorial discretion will be discussed infra Section I.B. [Vol. 98:1007 intended to limit federal jurisdiction over juveniles.64 While substan tive limitations on federal jurisdiction, alone, do not "necessarily im plicate a concomitant judicial power to look behind such decision [ s ] ,"65 the legislative history shows that Congress intended the court to re strict jurisdiction to only those cases that truly merit federal involve ment. Thus, Congress chose to abstain from juvenile delinquency matters absent the existence of a substantial federal interest.66
Although the JJDPA establishes a mechanism that increases the federal role in the prosecution of juvenile crime, the statute is, first and foremost, a funding mechanism authorizing grants to states, local governments, and private agencies to coordinate and encourage the development of programs designed to address the juvenile delin quency problem.67 Congress recognized that federal intervention in the juvenile delinquency field was imperative in order to "provide needed financial assistance and resources" to help with "a State and local problem which must be dealt with by the State and local gov ernments."68 Rather than creating a federal infrastructure for the prosecution and treatment of juvenile offenders, the JJDPA estab lished federal programs that focused primarily on researching the ef fectiveness of various delinquency and preventative programs.69 Al though the JJDPA established a new program to coordinate juvenile delinquency programs operated by the federal government, the pri mary purpose of this program was to provide comprehensive national leadership for addressing the problems of juvenile delinquency.70 Be cause juvenile delinquency efforts involve areas of society that are co- 81, 84 (7th Cir. 1981) , which recognizes that the certifica tion process is a part of the general policy of federal abstention). It is important to remem ber that prior to the enactment of the JJDP A, Congress had minimal involvement in juvenile delinquency prosecutions and that the JJ DP A represented an attempt to include the federal government in this field. The policy of abstention recognizes that Congress will not enter this particular field unless there is a substantial federal interest. ordinated by state and local governments, such as "law enforcement, education, [and] recreation,"71 Congress recognized that community resources and state and local organizations are critical in dealing with juvenile offenders effectively and humanely.72 In fact, the legislative history primarily discusses how congressional action will assist the states in improving their own juvenile justice systems.73 It is therefore significant to recall that even today, the federal government has no de tention facilities to offer services to children adjudicated as delin quents in federal district court.74
Even as Congress expanded the areas of federal jurisdiction into drug offenses and serious violent felonies,75 Congress did not eliminate the focus upon the idea that the State should exercise primary control over juvenile delinquency. Specifically, Congress rejected full adop tion of recommendations by the Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime that would have eliminated the policy of federal ab stention and provided federal courts with original jurisdiction over federal crimes by juveniles.76 Instead, Congress concluded that the policy of federal abstention is an important and beneficial concept that should be respected, absent a determination that a substantial federal interest is involved.77 Thus, Congress recognized that the state juve nile courts were the appropriate place to handle the problem of delin quency.
While subsequent amendments to the 1974 statute have expanded the grounds for assumption of jurisdiction by the federal government for serious violent felonies,78 the inherent preference for state jurisdic tion over delinquency proceedings is still present.79 Congress reiter-71. S. REP. No. 93-1011 No. 93- , at 65-66 (1974 No. 98-225 (1984) Vol. 98:1007 ated this preference for state jurisdiction in its 1984 amendments when it stated that the prosecution of juvenile off enders should be reserved for only those cases involving particularly serious conduct.80 In order to define serious conduct and the substantial federal interest concept, Congress stated that it intends that:
[A] determination that there is a "substantial Federal interest" [should] be based on a finding that the nature of the offense or the circumstances of the case give rise to special Federal concerns. Examples of such cases could include an assault on, or assassination of, a Federal official, an air craft hijacking, a kidnapping where State boundaries are crossed, a major espionage or sabotage offense, participation in large-scale drug traffick ing, or significant and willful destruction of property belonging to the United States.81
Thus, federal jurisdiction was intended only for a small subset of cases that truly implicate federal interests.82 The certification requirement is an integral component of the federal policy of abstention, ensuring that only those cases with a substantial federal interest enter the federal court system.83
Establishment of Standards
The enactment of the JJDPA and its subsequent amendments comprised a significant expansion of federal involvement in juvenile delinquency prosecution. In the 1984 amendments to the JJDP A, Congress found it necessary to outline the standards the court system should consider in assuming federal jurisdiction over a child and to de fine the "substantial federal interest" prong of the JJDP A.84 The Supreme Court has stated that judicial review is permitted only where should be reserved for only those cases involving particularly serious conduct by older juve niles. The committee continues to endorse these concepts .... " United States v. Juvenile Male #1, 86 F.3d 1314, 1321 n.9 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting the legislative history from the 1984 amendment to the JJDPA).
80. See S. REP. No. 98-225 (1984) there are meaningful standards to aid a court in its review.85 Accord ingly, the courts that have conducted review of the "substantial federal interest" prong of a federal prosecutor's certification have followed one of two tests: (a) a comparison of the crime committed to the list of crimes enumerated in the legislative history of the JJDP A, or (b) a review of the legislative history of the criminal statute violated. These approaches present workable and manageable standards for review of the reasons underlying the government's decision to proceed in fed eral court, and thus satisfy the Court's requirements for permitting ju dicial review.86
First, a court can determine if a "substantial federal interest" has been implicated by comparing the list of circumstances giving rise to special federal concerns in the JJDPA's legislative history to the crime allegedly committed by the juvenile. While the list of sample crimes noted above is not exhaustive, it provides a useful basis for determin ing by analogy whether Congress intended a crime to provide a suffi cient basis to assume jurisdiction over a juvenile.87 Courts in the Fourth Circuit have found this list to be an integral part of the statu tory restrictions that Congress placed upon the assumption of federal jurisdiction and to provide meaningful standards for reviewing the cer tification to determine if a "substantial federal interest" exists in a prosecution.88 As the Fourth Circuit wrote in United States v. NIB, 89
hen an offense is listed among the examples in the legislative his tory," a court can find that the "substantial federal interest" prong has been satisfied.90 A court could also resolve the "substantial federal in terest" question by determining if the alleged crime rises to the level of the crimes included in the list in the legislative history. For exam ple, in United States v. Male Juvenile,9 1 the federal prosecutor filed a certification under the JJDPA alleging that a "single instance of ordi nary bank robbery" amounted to a "substantial federal interest."92 In rejecting this argument, the court held that this crime is "clearly dif ferent in kind from those offenses suggested by the [legislative his- 101. See 86 F.3d at 1321. That Congress considered this offense to be particularly seri ous can be seen in the punishment prescribed for violators of the Act -imprisonment for up to fifteen years in circumstances where no one is injured and the provision for the possi bility of the death penalty if the carjacking results in the victim's death. See 86 F.3d at 1321. The court also found relevant the legislative history of the carjacking statute, which dis cussed the "rash of theft by juveniles" and the "substantial threat [they pose] to public safety. " 86 F.3d at 1321 (quoting 138 CONG. REC. S17,961 (1992) (remarks of Sen. Lauten berg)).
"strong indicators [that] more than a run of the mill federal interest" was involved.102
Prosecutorial Discretion
Some courts have rejected the argument that the JJDPA or the statute's legislative history supports judicial review of a prosecutor's certification.103 Instead of favoring judicial review, these critics hold that based upon traditional notions of prosecutorial discretion, judges are not competent to address this question at all.104 It has been the longstanding practice of the American criminal justice system to commit prosecutorial decisions to the complete discretion of the prosecutor.105 The decision about whether to prosecute -the charg ing decision -is typically considered to be one of the most prominent decisions committed to the prosecutor's discretionary power.106 Some courts have considered the certification of a "substantial federal inter est" to be a "perfunctory corollary to the decision to prosecute itself," and accordingly have held that this decision should be free from judi cial oversight.107 This argument reasons that because prosecutors make the determination of the existence of a "substantial federal in terest" in every case, they alone are competent to conclude that the statutory requirements of the certification have been met.108
Proponents of this viewpoint look to standards outlined by the United States Department of Justice for the determination of whether a "substantial Federal interest would be served by prosecution,"109 and conclude that judges are "ill-equipped" to review the factors upon 102. 86 F.3d at 1320-21. The application of this reasoning seems to accept the troubling rationale that a response to political pressure can be an adequate reason for Congress to federalize a crime. Yet this rationale at least provides a principled means for courts to limit the expansion of juvenile crime to areas where Congress did not intend federal jurisdiction to extend. It is argued that these factors are "administrative in nature, [deter mined] after a studied assessment of the Government's policy visions and priorities," and that just like a prosecutor's charging decision, this decision is ill suited to judicial review.112 The charging decision is normally not subject to judicial review because the prosecutor makes the determination based on the strength of the evidence and the prob able success of a trial on the charge.113 Arguably, these considerations may be beyond the expertise of reviewing courts.114
Yet the ability of courts to review the actions of a prosecutor, based upon the Justice Department's standards, is not outside the bounds of judicial action.
Significantly, even the Department of Justice Manual states that Un ited States Attorneys should take great care in determining whether a "substantial federal interest" exists un der the JJDP A, because the decision will likely be scrutinized and challenged.ns Moreover, unlike the considerations that are beyond the expertise of reviewing courts, judges routinely consider and review the factors that the Department of Justice believes comprise the de termination of a "substantial fe deral interest" in the JJDP A.
Courts, for instance, often review decisions by prosecutors that in corporate the standards set out by the Department of Justice in two REV. 1127, 1139-40 & n.66 (1997) (discussing the Department of Justice's belief that its at torneys will exercise discretion in prosecuting federal crimes and the failure of this policy, particularly as demonstrated by the repeated attempts by prosecutors to circumvent the mailing element in mail fraud cases). [Vol. 98:1007 fense Attorneys in Juvenile Cases , 124 when a juvenile is being trans ferred to criminal court, courts typically review both the juvenile's past record and the seriousness of the offense -two factors that are also part of the determination of whether a "substantial federal interest" exists.125 If courts are capable of reviewing these factors when a juve nile is transferred, they are also competent to review the certification for these same factors in the decision to assume federal jurisdiction. Yet these policy decisions are the very ones that many claim are "par ticularly ill-suited to judicial review."126 Despite this evidence that courts have the competence to review the factors that prosecutors use to determine whether a "substantial federal interest" exists in the prosecution, some commentators have argued that judicial review should be limited only to constitutional set tings.127 Although review of the prosecutor's decisionmaking in fed eral adult criminal law occurs under restricted circumstances, the re mainder of this Note will argue that the strong deference to federal abstention and the acceptance of separate procedural protections for juveniles merit an extension of the ability to review prosecutorial deci sions in the certification process.
II. P OLICY C ONSIDERATIONS J USTIFYING J UDICIAL R EVIEW
Congress has repeatedly stated that " [t] he United States has a long tradition of dealing differently with juveniles than with adults ... in the hope that juveniles can be rechannelled into becoming law abiding citizens."128 Children are not simply young adults; accordingly, the law has developed different procedures and rules that recognize the unique circumstances that surround childhood. Because of society's special treatment of children, the usual deference given to prosecutors should not extend to the juvenile delinquency context.
In the Gu tierre z de Marti nez case, the Court relied heavily on policy con-
RANDY HERTZ ET AL., TRIAL MANUAL FOR DEFENSE ATIORNEYS IN JUVENILE CASES {1991).
125. See HERTZ ET AL., supra note 124, at § 13.11; see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 5032 (West Supp. 1998); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 566-67 {1961) (asserting that the factors for review of a transfer decision should include the seriousness of the offense, the prosecutorial merit or the likelihood of indictment, and whether the client is amenable to treatment).
126. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 {1985); see also United States v. Juvenile Male J.AJ., 134 F.3d 905, 909 {8th Cir. 1998) {holding that the charging decisions involve criteria that are "precisely the sort of policy judgments invested in the executive, not the ju dicial, branch of government" (citations omitted)).
127. See Oymer, supra note 113 (noting that the charging decision is limited by the con stitutional protections of the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses). cems in its decision to permit judicial review.129 With regard to the JJDP A, there are equally important policy concerns that militate against a finding that judicial review should be prohibited.130 Such policy considerations are an appropriate basis for permitting judicial review.
This Part argues that these policy considerations -which include the importance that society places on the proper treatment of children and the need for an appropriate forum to meet children's needsmandate that courts should have the opportunity to review a prosecu tor's certification in these cases. Section II.A argues that the law's separate and different treatment of children and adults provides a jus tification for judicial review of certifications under the JJDP A. Sec tion II.B then argues that the goals of the juvenile court system and the current societal conception of the child cannot be respected by transforming the federal district court into a juvenile court. This Part concludes that the fe deral government should abstain from assuming jurisdiction in juvenile delinquency proceedings unless a sufficiently important federal interest is implicated.
A. Th e Status of the Child
The different treatment of children has an extensive historical foundation. At least as far back as the seventh century, society ac cepted that criminal law should treat juveniles differently than adults.131 Philosophers such as John Stuart Mill recognized an age before which individuals are not capable of making rational decisions about their own actions.132 These philosophers introduced the notion that until children possess the maturity and rationality of adults, the law should treat them differently to enable them to become produc tive members of adult society.133 American society has adopted these Vol. 98:1007 principles by applying different legal rules and principles in the rela tionships between children and both the state and their families.134 Within each of these settings, the law presumes that a child is incapa ble of voicing a rational preference and therefore substitutes another's articulation of the child's interests. 135 Within the law of the family, parents have constitutional rights to direct the upbringing and care of their children.136 The Supreme Court has held that the state can infringe upon this constitutional right only in the most extreme settings.137 Under this deferential standard, par ents have the right, for example, to punish their children physically,138 direct the medical treatment their children may receive,139 and to vol untarily commit their children to a mental institution.140
134. These settings involve a combination of both state and federal law. The majority of laws that address a child's relationship to his family are governed by state law, such as di vorce, child custody, and abuse and neglect proceedings. Federal law also makes significant contributions to the understanding that the law should apply differently to children. See in fra notes 136-148 and accompanying text.
135. There has been much scholarly research and debate about the ability and appropri· ateness of substituting a child's voice with that of either a parent or the state. Instead of as suming that a child's voice can be adequately voiced through other means, many scholars have recommended a new standard where children's voices are recognized for their unique ness. See, e.g., Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Ch ildren 's Per sp ectives and the Law, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 11, 12 (1994) . The law can be said to "presume" that a child is incapable of vqicing a rational preference, because some children will not be immature but will still be accorded this status. For instance, a child could have significant experience and expertise in dealing with money and contracts and still be able to void a con tract on the basis of his age, while an adult without such experience would not be accorded the same protection. 773, 788-91 (1988) (discussing how most juveniles admitted to psychiatric fa. cilities have problems associated with normal development, not severe or acute mental ill ness). These standards are in stark contrast to laws that prohibit assault against adults and commitment laws that require a person to be a threat to themselves or others before they can be involuntarily instiqitionalized. Compare VA. CODE ANN . § § 16. 1-335 et seq. (1998) with § 16.1-345(1) (comparing Virginia statutes for commitment of adults and minors).
It is not only in these intra-family settings that family law has treated children differently than adults.141 Children are not permitted to appear as parties in divorce proceedings that involve decisions on their custodial arrangements, nor may they be privy to child support hearings.142 Instead, the "best interest" standard has developed to substitute the state's voice as a proxy for the child's.143 Because chil dren are not treated simply as little adults, the law has developed the "best interest" standard to address the unique needs of children.144
This different treatment extends beyond family law into relations between children and the state. Historically in this country, many children were subj ect to the same criminal proceedings and sentences as adult criminals were.145 Progressive reformers of the nineteenth century saw this undifferentiated treatment as a great injustice to chil dren, who were viewed by many as incapable of possessing criminal intent and in need of specialized treatment.146 Accordingly, these re formers formalized their ideas for a new approach to dealing with young offenders in the establishment of the juvenile court system.147 The juvenile court, thus, "was part of a general movement directed 141. See Fitzgerald, supra note 135, at 14 (noting that the law "consigns children to the private realm of their parents' care and control"). Furthermore, it is interesting to note that in certain contexts, such as those involving free speech rights and the ability to petition a court for an abortion, children are given standing in legal disputes that are "of keen interest to us as adults." Id. at 15.
142. See Fitzgerald, supra note 135, at 42, 46-47.
143. The "best interest" standard is utilized in a variety of family law settings, including abuse and neglect proceedings, custody disputes, guardianship, and judicial waiver hearings. Statues that mandate that decisions be made in the best interests of the child often specify the standards by which a judge should make his or her determination. For example, in Michigan, the "best interests of the child" standard means the "sum total of the following factors [are] to be considered, evaluated, and determined by the court: (a) The love, affec tion, and other emotional ties existing between the parties involved and the child. (b) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to give the child love, affection, and guidance and continuation of the educating and raising of the child in its religion or creed, if any. (c) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care recogni2ed and permitted under the laws of this state in place of medical care, and other material needs 144. It is possible to argue that permitting the prosecutor to file an unreviewable certifi cation is simply another application of the best interest standard -substitution of the voice of the prosecutor for that of the child. This argument is unpersuasive. Unlike the traditional best interest standard in which the role of the party whose voice is substituted for that of the child is to assist or protect, the role of the prosecutor is to punish and penalize the child. [Vol. 9B:1007 toward removing adolescents from the criminal law process and cre ating special programs for delinquent, dependent, and neglected chil dren. "148 Today, juvenile courts continue to operate in a procedurally and substantively different manner than criminal courts. For example, the juvenile court system considers rehabilitation to be its primary goal.149 The courts recognize that children are fundamentally different from adults in their cognitive abilities and their amenability to treatment.150 While states have instituted more punitive measures for juvenile de linquents, which include an increased focus on incarceration as op posed to probation, the severity and purpose of sentencing in juvenile as opposed to criminal court is still dramatically different.151 Signifi cantly, sentences for juveniles normally terminate when a child is no longer considered a juvenile, typically at age eighteen or twenty-one. Unlike an adult sentence, which does not relate to the age of the of fender, a juvenile sentence "recognizes the unique physical, psycho logical, and social features of young persons in the definition and ap plication of delinquency standards."152 The changes in the juvenile court system throughout the states have not altered this central func tion of the court.153 These changes recognize that while juveniles are 153. The increase in t!Ie use of punitive measures against juvenile offenders has oc curred as many have questioned t!Ie continued need for a separate juvenile court. States responsible and blameworthy for their actions, it is unrealistic to treat them as if they are fully mature individuals capable of rational adult decisionmaking.154 Accordingly, states have lowered the age at which a child is presumed capable of making rational decisions and therefore subj ect to criminal prosecutions.155 These individuals are then re moved from the juvenile court and transferred to adult criminal pro ceedings.156 While the juvenile justice legislation has stated that younger children can face criminal prosecution, the juvenile court re mains the forum where children's interests and uniqueness are still recognized.157
Although the Supreme Court has recognized and extended certain due process protections to children,158 the law continues to recognize the inherent differences between children and adults. For example, the federal Constitution does not extend the right to a jury trial to children.159 The Supreme Court has justified this different treatment on the ground that juries will increase the adversarial nature of the proceeding -an aspect that juvenile forums attempt to minimize.160 have responded to the criticism of the alleged failure of the juvenile courts by easing the standards for the transfer of children from juvenile to criminal court. Commentators sup porting this view claim that the juvenile court was not established nor equipped to deal with violent juvenile crime. The societal view is that juveniles who commit violent crime are not capable of rehabilitation. See Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Crim inal Responsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CruMINOLOGY 68 (1997).
As the concern about the rising rate of juvenile crime and the possible inability of rehabilita tive intervention to succeed has increased, some states have responded by adopting blended sentencing schemes that permit juvenile court judges to impose both juvenile and adult sen tences at the same time. After a child has been given rehabilitative intervention, the court can determine how the child has responded and whether the adult sentence needs to be im posed. See Geraghty, supra note 149, at 191 n.3 (citing PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., STATE REsPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME 55-56 (1996) 435 (1997) . Fur thermore, while the JJDPA provides for transfer of juveniles to adult court, the fact that a judge must make a determination that a criminal court is the appropriate forum is another example of the law's different treatment of juveniles. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 5032. The law obvi ously does not provide a similar hearing for adults to determine whether they should be tried in a criminal court.
158. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 359 (1970) (providing for "beyond a reason able doubt" standard in delinquency prosecutions); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 10 (1967) (pro viding right to counsel, notice of charges, cross-examination and confrontation, and privilege against self-incrimination); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966) (holding that children are not entitled to bail or indictment by grand jury). See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) .
159.
160. See Geraghty, supra note 149, at 223-24 (discussing that jury trials do not take into account the special needs of children and that children have little comprehension of the pro cess). [Vol. 98:1007 Although the presumption of prosecutorial discretion is fairly well entrenched in the adult criminal system, the legal system's diff erent treatment of children provides compelling reasons to deviate from that standard.161 Importantly, in the federal system, all felony defendants are afforded the constitutional protection of a grand jury indictment.162 Accordingly, the independent review over the charging decision is ac complished in an adult proceeding by the grand jury indictment.163 Federal prosecutors, however, proceed against children by informa tion.164 While it may be somewhat duplicative to provide for judicial review of a charging decision against an adult defendant, the lack of a comparable check upon the federal prosecutor in a juvenile proceed ing is glaring.165
This lack of protection is even more significant given the ability of prosecutors to transfer a juvenile to adult status.166 Children who are transferred to adult status would thus be treated more harshly than adult defendants who are given the protections of the grand jury in dictment requirement. This lack of protection is significant because federal prosecutors attempt to try most children brought to federal court as adults.167 Therefore, the lack of important protections for ju veniles in the federal system should permit judicial review of the prosecutor's certification in order to protect children from potential abuse by the justice system. This special relationship between children and the state supports the continued existence of the juvenile court system and the different treatment of children from adult offenders.168 Because the purpose and structure of the juvenile justice system di ffers from the adult sys- 165. While there is much current debate about the value of the grand jury system to pro tect the interests of defendants, the federal government, as opposed to many state govern ments, has not shed its requirement of prosecution by indictment for felony defendants. Ac cordingly, children are being denied the protection of independent review by a grand jury.
166. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 5032 (permitting the transfer of a child as young as age thirteen).
While the decision to transfer a child to adult status is subject to review, the initial decision to bring a child into fe deral court lnight not be. The factors that establish a substantial fe d eral interest are different from the criteria for determining whether a child is mature enough to be prosecuted as an adult. Therefore, review of the transfer decision is not sufficient pro tection.
167. It appears that most children brought to fe deral court are tried as adults. Only 200 or so juveniles are tried in federal court each year. Most of these children are Native Americans. Because many federal prosecutions are politically motivated attempts to obtain higher sentences, the maj ority of federal prosecutors attempt to try children as adults. See Scalia, supra note 74, at 3; see also ABA Report, supra note 4, at 15. As previously noted, Congress has expanded the types of crimes that can be prosecuted in federal court. It is questionable, however, whether these new laws will address the problem they were designed to solve. First, due to the limited amount of resources and reach of federal law enforcement, federal criminal law will have a limited im pact upon the conduct that Congress seeks to regulate. As a report issued by the American Bar Association noted, it is unlikely that the federalization trend will have any appreciable effect on crime without a significant infusion of money.177 Accordingly, the rising trend of ju venile crime, which Congress cited as a primary factor behind the en actment of the JJDP A, is unlikely to be addressed by trying juveniles in fe deral court.178 Second, the enactment of a federal criminal statute may give the false impression of greater crime control and that ade quate resources have been applied to the problem. This impression could disrupt the funding of state criminal processes that are not tied to fe deral enforcement.179 Because state juvenile courts and treatment programs already receive less funding than their adult counterparts, the false impression of greater crime control could lead to fewer re sources being directed to the state juvenile delinquency system.180 176. For a discussion of the Gutierrez de Martin ez decision and the policy considerations supporting it, see supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
177. See ABA Report, supra note 4, at 18-19 (noting that no effect will be likely without a "massive (and unlikely) infusion of federal money" and that police executives have stated that it is "unrealistic to expect that federal authorities will have the resources and inclination to investigate and prosecute traditionally state and local offenses"). This report also notes that federal prosecution of domestic drug trafficking, the largest segment of federal prosecu tions, amounts for only two percent of all prosecutions in the nation. See ABA Report, su pra note 4, at 20.
178.
It is possible to argue that many of the federal crimes that have been enacted are in direct response to political pressure to address rising crime rates. Thus, federal interests have been determined on the basis of a crime's seriousness and the level of public concern, rather than its connection to a substantial federal interest in the prosecution. See ABA Re port, supra note 4, at 15. While passing legislation may address immediate public pressure for a direct response to a particular incident, the enactment of a fe deral criminal code will not solve the crime problem and may exacerbate the effect. For a discussion of the legisla tive history of the JJDPA, see supra Section I.B.
179. See ABA Report, supra note 4, at 21 (noting that two highly publicized fe deral statutes enacted in 1994 -involving drive-by shootings and interstate domestic violence, were not cited in a single prosecution in 1997). Furthermore, the prosecution of crimes at the federal level may have the concurrent effect of decreasing the stature of the state crimi nal justice system that remains the primary body addressing criminal law in American soci ety.
180. See Geraghty, supra note 149, at218 & n.67.
Finally, the federalization of crime that is duplicative of state and local prosecutions places significant burdens on an already over whelmed federal system.181 The increase in federal criminal proceed ings reduces the time that federal judges can allocate to the traditional functions of the fe deral judiciary.182 The Judicial Conference of the United States has noted that the federalization trend will "negatively impact on the ability of the federal courts to hear federal criminal prosecutions, as well as carry out vital civil responsibilities in a timely manner."183
In addition to these concerns with the federalization of crime gen erally, two important differences between the federal and state system make federal adjudication of juvenile delinquency both unwise and harmful to the goals of the juvenile justice system: (1) federal judges and other court officials lack the experience to work with juvenile of fenders, and (2) Additionally, it is significant that federal criminal cases generally are given scheduling priority over civil cases (whether between an individual and the government, or between individuals). Finally, it should also be noted that some commentators have opined that the reduction in time for traditional federal judicial functions may have the effect of eroding the quality and distinctiveness of the federal judiciary, as either more judges are added or judges cannot adequately and capably handle the judicial tasks before them. See ABA Report, su pra note 4, at 35-39.
184. While only 150 to 200 children are tried as juveniles each year in federal court, the certification issue is critical for two reasons. First, as is described in this Section, even for these 200 children, state courts continue to be the best forum to address their interest. Sec ond, the certification requirement is the first step to the prosecution of children as adults in federal court. regarding the confidentiality of the proceedings. Questions such as these, which would be commonplace in a state court, could occupy a significant portion of a federal trial. The ex tension of the trial for these reasons does not serve the interests of the court, the public, or (Vol. 98:1007 around the concept that children are fundamentally different from adults and therefore focuses on the unique problems associated with the adjudication of children.186 Juvenile courts are flexible systems that permit judges to take creative steps to lessen the trauma that sim ply appearing in court may cause a child.187 The juvenile court is a place where the aggressiveness of the adult criminal court should be kept to a minimum.188 Thus, it is more likely that the participants in a state juvenile proceeding will be committed to outcomes that focus on the best interests of the child involved.189 Juvenile court judges, due to their experience with children, have the ability and knowledge to modify trials to take into account the needs of children and to control attorneys from deviating from the court's specialized purpose.190 In the few cases they will ever hear, however, federal officials will not re ceive the training or experience they need to sensitize themselves to the unique needs of children in delinquency proceedings. Further more, scant federal prosecutorial and judicial resources are wasted when these actors must gain expertise in this different trial proce dure.191
The lack of experience of court officials can also have a significant impact upon the success of the disposition or rehabilitation. As op posed to criminal courts, where sentences are based upon statutory guidelines, dispositions in juvenile court are based upon the particular needs of the individual child.192 States typically do not have formulas for sentencing juveniles and instead grant discretion to the trial judge to adopt an appropriate disposition.193 While the JJDPA also grants the child. The inefficient use of resources is only compounded when the availability of the state juvenile court is considered.
186. See Geraghty, supra note 149, at 206; Scott & Grisso, supra note 152, at 139 ("Mod em developmental psychology provides substantial, if indirect, evidence that adolescent choices about involvement in crime and their decisions as defendants in the legal process reflect cognitive and psychosocial immaturity.").
187. See Geraghty, supra note 149, at 224. The flexibility of the juvenile court system has long historical roots. See SIDREMAN & REAMER, supra note 131, at 6 (quoting from the first juvenile court judge in Illinois as to how he, as a juvenile court judge, acts differently toward children).
188. See Geraghty, supra note 149, at 224.
189. See id. at 223-26 (arguing that because the participants in the juvenile court under stand the cognitive differences between children and adults, they will incorporate this phi losophy into their trial practice).
190.
A judge could keep a prosecutor from overzealously cross-examining a child wit ness or from moving the proceeding away from its rehabilitative focus. Furthermore, in states that permit jury trials, the judge could adopt "flexible" systems that could minimize the impact of a jury upon a child's courtroom experience. See id. at 224-25. 191. See supra notes 177-183 and accompanying text.
192. See HERTZ ET AL., supra note 124, at § 38.01.
193. Unlike criminal court, where sentencing is based upon the crime for which one is convicted, juvenile court sentences are based upon the needs of the child. If a child does not this discretion to the trial judge,194 it is unlikely that a federal judge will have the interdisciplinary connections that are necessary to address the special needs of the child.195 Furthermore, the United States Sen tencing Guidelines, which were not drafted with children in mind, re strict the discretion of the court.196 Thus, without the experience of daily work with children and the interdisciplinary connections that are developed through this work, the federal court is unable to achieve a child-centered focus as successfully as have state juvenile courts. Second, the lack of involvement of the federal government in the treatment of juveniles impedes its ability to assist in achieving the goals of the juvenile delinquency system. The states have traditionally been the administrative body that has dealt with juvenile crime.197 Be cause the goal of these proceedings is to help the juvenile re-enter so ciety, 198 juvenile courts need to be connected with services and pro grams that can achieve this purpose. The federal system is not equipped to address the needs of juvenile offenders.199 The federal government does not offer the treatment programs and services that juveniles require.200 Instead, these programs, which include both resi dential and nonresidential programs, are located and operated in the communities where juveniles live. State juvenile court officials know the programs that are successful in these communities because they refer juveniles there every day. In fact, the federal government does not even operate a residential treatment facility for juvenile offenders or employ juvenile probation or parole officers or attorneys (either prosecutors or defense attorneys) with specific experience in repre senting juvenile clients.201 require treatment, a sentence may not be imposed. Even for serious crimes, a juvenile court can typically dismiss the delinquency finding, concluding that the respondent does not re quire treatment. See id. at § 38.03(a).
194. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 5037 (West Supp. 1998).
195. These interdisciplinary connections can include, for example, relationships with social workers, community-based delinquency programs, and child psychologists. See Scott & Grisso, supra note 152, at 181-89. Because the juvenile justice system is child-focused, a close analysis of the causes of delinquency and the potential for constructive intervention is required. See Geraghty, supra note 149, at 210-11. 196 . Significantly, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines "take no account of adolesr ..ent development." ABA Report, supra note 4, at 11 n.17. These are features which are central to the rehabilitative sentencing function of a juvenile court and which, according to Congress, are still important and primary goals of delinquency prosecutions in the federal system.
197. Since crime was not originally thought of as a federal issue, states had the administrative responsibility to deal with the criminal problems within their borders.
198. See Geraghty, supra note 149, [198] [199] [200] [201] . See ABA Report, supra note 4, at 11 n.17.
See id.
201. See id. While it is true that state officials may not be specifically trained, the value of experience in working with children cannot be overstated.
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As in Gu tierre z de Mart inez, important policy reasons exist to permit judicial review that will ensure the accuracy of the prosecutor's certifi�ation. In juvenile cases, society's concern with the upbringing of children provides such a basis for judicial review. Although it is widely understood that there is no easy answer to juvenile delinquency and the problems of juvenile crime, states have the procedural and substantive experience to address the complexities of the problem. As noted by the American Bar Association, the increasing federalization of juvenile crime has "no obvious benefit"202 and may, in fact, have the effect of frustrating one of the original reasons for the passage of the JJDPA -to encourage and enable the states to experiment with dif ferent types of programs that work with juveniles.203 The federal gov ernment, and specifically the federal district court, has less of a chance to accomplish the specific goals of the juvenile delinquency system. By providing for review over the jurisdictional provision of the JJDPA, Congress recognized that the adverse consequences that come with federal prosecution of children militate against increasing federal prosecutions. Accordingly, there are persuasive reasons for courts to review the prosecutor's certification to ensure that only truly signifi cant federal interests will outweigh these important policy rationales.
CONCLUSION
While the grounds for federal jurisdiction are present and continu ously expanding, Congress has reiterated its position that in these mat ters, the federal government should defer to the states. A court has a responsibility to ensure that its jurisdiction has been properly invoked.
Under the procedure established in Gu tierre z de Mart inez, a court can review a prosecutor's certification to ensure substantive compliance with the jurisdictional requirements. Congress, through the legislative history of the JJDPA, has provided the courts with manageable and workable standards, and it is the role of the judicial system to ensure that this deference is upheld.
As long as the judicial system continues to apply different proce dural rules to children, the state, given its unique interest in the rear ing and proper treatment of children, should ensure that the most ap propriate forum for addressing children's needs is found. The overwhelming evidence is that in the arena of law enforcement gener ally and juvenile crime specifically, the state system is the appropriate venue. Because the treatment of a child will differ significantly based upon the certification decision, courts must ensure that there is in fact 202 Id. at 11 n.17. 203. See supra Section I.B; supra note 3 and accompanying text.
